Ownership change is often more informative than cash amount
For founders in particular, percentage ownership change can be a better behavioural measure than euro value. A €1.2 billion sale sounds dramatic. A reduction from 24.7 percent to 24.1 percent sounds rather less like a vote of no confidence. Sometimes that calmer framing is closer to the truth.
This is not to say ownership change should replace notional. A tiny percentage sale in a very large company can still matter, especially if it breaks a pattern of previous holding behaviour. But ownership change is a useful antidote to the theatrical tendencies of large euro amounts.
If your model can only afford one extra variable alongside capped notional, ownership change is a strong candidate. It is simple, economically meaningful, and often available from the filing or related beneficial-ownership disclosures.
Distinguish sells from buys, because the asymmetry is real
The case for capping giant sales is stronger than for giant buys. Large insider buys are rarer, harder to explain away with liquidity management, and more likely to represent deliberate risk-taking. If a founder or executive is putting fresh capital to work in the open market at very large size, that is usually worth attention.
Even so, liquidity still matters. A huge buy can be connected to support operations, control contests, or structured transactions. The broader point is that scoring systems should not assume perfect symmetry between buys and sells. The motives differ, the constraints differ, and the base rates differ.
A sensible methodology can therefore cap both sides for consistency, while allowing the directional component and contextual modifiers to reflect the asymmetry.
What the cap does not fix
It cannot read around legal or tax structures
Some filings are maddeningly terse. They report a transaction that is economically linked to another leg elsewhere, or to a derivative, trust, or family vehicle not fully visible in the same document. A cap cannot solve disclosure opacity. It can only reduce the damage done by taking a giant headline number too literally.
This is especially relevant in cross-border cases, where filing formats, beneficial-ownership conventions, and transaction coding differ. Harmonising those records is hard enough without letting a single outlier notional dictate the score.
It does not replace event-level reporting
A quantitative score is a ranking device, not a substitute for reading. If a founder sells €2.5 billion in a block, that event may deserve coverage regardless of how the score is capped. The market may care about the discount, the investor mix, the lock-up, or the signalling effect on future supply. None of that disappears because the model has decided not to treat €2.5 billion as 2.5 times more informative than €1 billion.
This is the correct division of labour. The model keeps the ranking sane. The analyst keeps the story honest.
It will occasionally understate a genuinely important trade
Every cap creates false negatives at the margin. There will be cases where a transaction above €1 billion is genuinely extraordinary in a way the score should recognise more strongly. That is the price of robustness.
The alternative, however, is not perfection. It is a system in which a handful of founder block sales repeatedly hijack the top and bottom deciles, degrading the usefulness of the ranking for everyone else. In production, robust and slightly conservative usually beats theoretically pure and routinely derailed.
The regulatory backdrop, briefly and without romance
Disclosure rules give us the raw material
In Europe, the Market Abuse Regulation sets the framework for managers’ transactions, including the requirement to notify transactions conducted by persons discharging managerial responsibilities and persons closely associated with them. National regulators such as the AMF in France implement and publish within that framework. In the US, the SEC’s Section 16 regime, including Forms 3, 4, and 5, provides analogous raw material for officers, directors, and large beneficial owners.
These systems are invaluable because they create a public record. They are less helpful when one wants to distinguish a founder liquidity event from a discretionary informational trade. That is not a criticism. It is simply a reminder that a filing regime is a disclosure mechanism, not a scoring methodology.