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Tracking Women in C-Suite: Insider Filings from 2015 to 2026, Sigma Journal

Women in Corporate Leadership: Insights from Insider Filings

How have women’s roles in corporate leadership evolved from 2015 to 2026? Insider filings provide a unique lens to examine this shift and its implications.

By Sigma Research·May 17, 2026·13 min · 2,896 words

One signal is public, timestamped, and still oddly underused, the name on the filing.

Insider gender dynamics: women in C-suite filings, 2015-2026

There is a tidy corporate story about progress in leadership, and then there is the paperwork. Insider filings sit closer to the paperwork. They are regulated, dated, attributable, and difficult to polish with a sustainability report. If you want to know whether women are appearing more often among the executives and directors who actually trigger market disclosure, filings are a useful place to look.

They are not a perfect place. A filing does not tell you whether an executive is powerful, merely senior enough, connected enough, or regulated enough to disclose. It does not tell you whether a person was promoted because the pipeline improved or because the board needed one more non-executive director before the annual report went to print. It certainly does not tell you whether a trade was discretionary, pre-planned, tax-driven, or the result of stock compensation vesting. Markets are generous with caveats.

Still, for a publication that spends its life around Form 4s, PDMR disclosures, and director dealing notices, the attraction is obvious. Filings create a long, standardised trail of who was in the room and who touched the stock. For the period from 2015 to 2026, the interesting question is not simply whether women file. They do. The question is how the share of women among filers has changed over time across markets, and what that change really measures.

Why filings are a better lens than corporate biographies

The usual way to study gender in leadership is to count seats: board seats, executive committee seats, CEO appointments. Those counts matter, but they are static snapshots. Insider filings add motion. They record when a person with reportable status actually enters the public tape through a transaction.

That distinction matters for two reasons.

Filings capture the regulated perimeter of influence

In the United States, Section 16 filings cover directors, officers, and beneficial owners above the threshold. In the European Union and post-Brexit UK framework, MAR-style disclosure captures persons discharging managerial responsibilities, PDMRs, and closely associated persons. The perimeter is not identical, but in each case the filing population is a practical proxy for the visible senior layer around listed companies.

This makes filings useful for tracking representation over time. If the share of women among filers rises, one of three things is usually happening, often all at once: more women are reaching roles that trigger disclosure, more women are serving on boards, or the market’s listed-company mix is shifting toward sectors with different leadership demographics.

Filings add behavioural texture, not just headcount

A board composition table tells you who sits where. A filing tells you who traded, when, and in what direction. That allows a richer question: has the female share of all filers increased, and does the female share of buyers differ from the female share of sellers?

That second question is where analysts can get themselves into trouble. Executive sales are common. Open-market buys are comparatively scarce. If women are underrepresented in the filing population overall, they will naturally be underrepresented in buys as well, even if buy propensity is identical. Conversely, if women are overrepresented among independent directors, and independent directors trade less frequently than executives, a raw filing count may understate their presence in the senior population. Statistics have a habit of needing context.

Market	Regulator	Rule	Deadline	Notes
FR	AMF	MAR Art 19	T+3	PDMR and closely associated person disclosures, published by issuer and regulated under EU MAR framework.
EU	ESMA	MAR Art 19	T+3	Common framework with local publication differences across member states.
US	SEC	Exchange Act Section 16, Form 4	T+2	Highly structured filing regime for directors, officers, and 10% beneficial owners.
UK	FCA	UK MAR Art 19	T+3	Post-Brexit UK MAR largely preserves the PDMR disclosure architecture.

Insider dealing regimes are similar enough to compare directionally, but not cleanly enough to ignore scope differences.

Deadlines shape visibility, not representation

Filing deadlines, T+2 in the US and commonly T+3 under MAR-style regimes, affect timeliness and perhaps data quality, but they do not directly alter gender representation. What does alter representation is who falls inside the filing net. This is why any serious article on gender dynamics in filings should separate legal coverage from social change. Mixing the two produces neat narratives and poor measurement.

What changed from 2015 to 2026, even before you touch the trading data

The period from 2015 to 2026 is not arbitrary. It spans a decade in which board diversity moved from investor preference to policy architecture.

Board quotas and targets changed the visible senior population

France is the obvious case. The Copé-Zimmermann law, adopted in 2011, set binding quotas for women on boards of large companies, with implementation milestones that materially changed board composition in the following years. By the mid-2010s, France had become one of the leading large markets for female board representation. If your filing regime captures directors, that change should show up in the filing population.

Across Europe, pressure widened. National quotas, comply-or-explain codes, stewardship expectations, and then the EU Women on Boards Directive all pushed listed companies toward higher female representation, especially among non-executive directors. The exact effect on filings depends on market structure and role definitions, but the direction is not mysterious.

Executive committees changed more slowly than boards

Boards are easier to regulate than operating management. A nomination committee can adjust a board slate relatively quickly. Rebuilding the C-suite pipeline takes longer, and often collides with the stubborn fact that companies cannot appoint three CFOs at once merely to satisfy a chart.

That matters because the phrase “women in C-suite filings” can mislead if the underlying filing regime includes many directors who are not C-suite officers. A rise in female filer share from 2015 to 2026 may reflect faster gains in board representation than in executive office. The distinction is not semantic. It changes the interpretation of the trend.

Sector mix also matters

Healthcare, consumer, and some service sectors often show different gender representation patterns from heavy industry, energy, and some parts of technology. If the listed universe in one market tilts toward sectors with higher female executive representation, the female share of filers may rise even without a broad governance shift.

This is why a proper market study should report at least three cuts: all filers, executive filers only, and director filers only. Without that split, you may simply be measuring the changing composition of boards.

How to measure female share of filers without fooling yourself

This is the section where methodology earns its keep. It is also where many otherwise decent analyses quietly become decorative.

Step one, define the unit of analysis

There are at least four plausible units:

Share of filings by women
Useful for measuring visible transaction flow, but biased by trading frequency.
Share of unique filers who are women
Better for representation, but sensitive to repeat filers and identifier quality.
Share of buy filers who are women
Good for behavioural comparison, but sparse.
Share of sell filers who are women
Larger sample, but more contaminated by compensation-related disposals.

For a profile article on gender dynamics, the cleanest core metric is usually the share of unique filers who are women, by year and market, then split by buy-only, sell-only, and mixed filers.

Step two, classify role before classifying behaviour

A female independent director filing one annual sale after vesting should not be treated as equivalent to a female CFO making repeated open-market buys. Both are valid filings. They answer different questions.

A robust taxonomy would include at least:

CEO
CFO
other named executive or officer
chair
non-executive director
supervisory board member where relevant
closely associated person
beneficial owner or equivalent where applicable

If the article is specifically about the C-suite, then non-executive directors should either be excluded from the headline metric or reported separately. Otherwise the title promises one thing and the denominator delivers another.

Step three, infer gender carefully, and report uncertainty

Most filing systems do not provide a gender field. Analysts therefore infer gender from names, honorifics, external biographies, pronouns in issuer materials, or manual verification. This is workable at scale, but imperfect.

The errors are not random. They cluster in multinational datasets, transliterated names, initials-only records, and cases where legal names differ from common names. Some people are non-binary, and many filing systems are not designed with that reality in mind. The least bad practice is to classify only where confidence is high, set ambiguous cases aside, and report the unclassified share.

Step four, separate transaction types

The phrase “buy/sell over time” sounds straightforward until you inspect the codes. In SEC Form 4 data, acquisitions and dispositions can arise from open-market trades, option exercises, grants, tax withholding, gifts, and conversions. MAR notices also include a range of transaction types. If you want a meaningful gender comparison, open-market buys should be isolated from administrative or compensation-driven events.

Otherwise you risk writing an article about conviction and accidentally measuring payroll mechanics.

What the trend probably looks like, market by market

Without the article-specific extraction from our 162,000 filings, we cannot print a league table. We can still state the likely shape of the data, because the institutional drivers are visible.

France is likely among the leaders in female filer share

France’s board reforms were early and binding. If your filing population includes directors, France should show a relatively high and rising female share from 2015 onward. The increase may be less dramatic in executive-only subsets, because board parity has progressed faster than C-suite parity.

This is one of those cases where the filing tape probably confirms what governance data has shown for years: France moved early, and the paperwork should reflect it.

The Nordics may score well, but for different reasons

Nordic markets often rank strongly on board and leadership representation, though legal routes differ by country. In filing data, that can produce high female filer shares, especially where listed-company governance structures make directors highly visible in disclosures. Again, role splits matter. A market can look progressive on all filers and less so on executive filers.

The US may look better in structured data than in broad representation

The SEC filing regime is clean, which makes it analytically attractive. But the scope differs from MAR markets, and the listed universe is vast and sectorally uneven. Female representation among directors has improved materially over the decade, helped by investor pressure and exchange-level board diversity initiatives, though those initiatives have had a more complicated legal afterlife than their press releases suggested.

In practice, the US may produce excellent charts and messier comparisons.

The UK and continental Europe likely show steady gains, with local quirks

The UK’s post-Brexit regime remains close enough to MAR to support directional comparison. Across Europe, the broad trend should be upward from 2015 to 2026, though the slope will vary with board reforms, sector composition, and data quality. Smaller markets may show more volatility simply because the annual number of unique filers is lower.

The behavioural question: do women file differently?

This is the part readers usually want, and the part that most deserves restraint.

Women may appear less often in raw buy counts for structural reasons

Open-market insider buying is relatively rare compared with selling. If women remain underrepresented in the senior population, they will also be underrepresented among buyers in raw counts. That does not imply lower conviction, lower skill, or a different risk appetite. It may simply reflect fewer opportunities to appear in the sample.

The right comparison is conditional: among comparable roles, sectors, firm sizes, and compensation structures, do women and men differ in the probability of filing a buy, the average size of buys, or the timing around corporate events? That is a proper research design. Anything simpler is usually a personality test for the author.

Sales are a poor proxy for sentiment

Sales dominate many insider datasets because executives receive equity compensation, diversify, meet tax obligations, and follow pre-arranged plans. If women are newer entrants to the C-suite, they may have different vesting schedules or smaller accumulated holdings, which could alter sale patterns mechanically. A naive chart of “female share of sales” may therefore tell you more about tenure and pay design than about behaviour.

The more useful question is whether representation gains reached the informative subset

For investors, the most interesting subset is often discretionary open-market buying by senior executives. If female share has risen in all filings but remains low in this narrow subset, that could mean one of several things: women are concentrated in non-trading roles, underrepresented in the most powerful executive positions, or simply too few in number for stable annual estimates. Any of those would be worth reporting. None should be guessed.

A practical blueprint for the Sigma dataset

If this topic is to become a recurring franchise, and it should, the next version needs a reproducible extraction from the filing database rather than a polite essay about what ought to be there.

The minimum viable dataset

For each filing from 2015 to 2026:

market
issuer
filing date
transaction date
filer name
filer identifier if available
role or title
transaction type
buy or sell flag
open-market versus non-open-market classification
value and volume where available
inferred gender
gender confidence score
source document URL or filing reference

From there, produce annual counts of unique filers by gender and role, plus filing counts by transaction direction.

The headline charts worth publishing

A useful package would include:

Female share of unique filers by year, all markets.
Female share of unique executive filers by year.
Female share of unique director filers by year.
Female share of open-market buy filers by year.
Market-level comparison for the latest full year.
Unknown or unclassified gender share, to keep everyone honest.

If you want one chart that readers will actually remember, use the executive-versus-director split. It will almost certainly show that governance reform moved the boardroom faster than the operating core.

The analytical tests worth running

Beyond descriptive charts, three tests would add real value:

Composition-adjusted trend: control for sector and market to see whether female filer share rose within comparable issuer groups.
Role-adjusted trade propensity: estimate whether women in similar roles are more or less likely to file a buy.
Event-type decomposition: compare open-market trades with compensation-linked events to avoid false behavioural stories.

This is not glamorous, but then neither is a filing notice. That has never stopped it from being useful.

What this says about markets, not just management

Insider filings are often treated as a trading signal with names attached. They are also a governance record with timestamps attached. On gender, that dual nature is valuable.

The expected rise in female filer share from 2015 to 2026 would not merely indicate better representation. It would show how regulation, investor pressure, and board design become visible in market micro-disclosures. It would also expose where progress is thinner than headlines suggest. If female representation rises strongly among directors but only modestly among executive buyers, the market is seeing the difference between access to oversight and access to operating power.

That is a more interesting story than a simple count of women on boards. It is also a less flattering one for companies that have mastered the optics of diversity while leaving the capital-allocation seats largely unchanged.

The next concrete step is straightforward: run the 2015-2026 extraction on unique filers, split executive from non-executive, classify open-market buys separately, and publish the unknown-gender rate alongside the headline trend. The open question is the one worth keeping: has the rise in women on the filing tape reached the subset of trades that investors actually treat as informative, or is it still mostly a boardroom story?